The first kind of subordinate collusion contracts, i.e., the colluding behavoir among the generation companies acting as agents, under two grades principal-agent mechanism of electricity market is thoroughly studied. First, the influence of colluding behaviors among generation companies on market premium is analyzed, the premium level is in direct proportion to the market share of collusion union and in inverse proportion to market demand elasticity. Then the influence of power network congestion on collusion is analyzed and it is pointed out that the collusion emerged in regions where power output is limited is usually to prevent malignant competition; and the collusion emerged in regions where power input is limited is usually to pursue the high monopoly profit. Finally, the legal basis to regulate colluding behavoir in electricity market in China is studied, and a method to effectively regulate colluding behavoir by negative incentive mechanism with rational intensity that is designed according to existing technical level is proposed. It might be available for reference to both market supervision and operating department.
Power system technology