been disposed of, many. Whereupon it occurs to Aristotle that his statement quite incidentally throws light upon what was with him a familiar subject of criticism—Anaxagoras' theory as to the infinite mixture of things (cf. e.g. Metaphysics, 10076 25 seq.; Physics, 1876 7 seq.). Here, then, he interjects, we can see how it was that Anaxagoras went wrong when he said, stating the case inadequately (d-jrearrj elirmv), that things are infinite both in multitude and in smallness. He could never have said so if he had not overlooked the fact that not smallness but fewness is the natural opposite of multitude. In a word, Aristotle's point is that Anaxagoras' error as to the infinite character of things was due to his faulty way of formulating just one of those oppositions which it is the specific business of the present inquiry to render exact; and the purport of the passage can be got only if we remember that the criticism directed against the Anaxagorean tenet is only an aside or afterthought. The force of the contention might be brought out by saying that Anaxagoras would not have fallen into the error of declaring that things were infinite if he had formulated the respect in which infinitude is possible by means of the exact antithesis of irXfjOos and okiyoTr)?; for it is clear that things are not infinite in one at least of these respects. If this reasoning holds good it appears to render the passage at once internally coherent and historically intelligible. The translation would run: ' But, absolutely speaking, two is few, for it is the first number characterised by deficiency. This is what makes it wrong for Anaxagoras to have been content with the assertion that all things are together infinite both in multitude and in smallness, instead of saying " in multitude and fewness." Had he said so he could not have asserted that they are infinite, because what is few is determined by two and not, as some maintain, by one.'
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