ABSTRACT The Chanak crisis of September-October 1922 brought the British government to the brink of international warfare. Although Britain observes 11 November 1918 as the end of the First World War, perhaps it is Chanak that truly marks the end of Britain’s Greater War. Echoing the strategic considerations that had prompted the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, and with many of the same political leaders involved (Kemal, Lloyd George, Churchill, Hughes, Massey), Chanak prompted a domestic and imperial crisis and demonstrated the limits of cynical uses of memory. This article uses Chanak to explore how cultural demobilisation intersects with diplomacy and statecraft.

The Chanak crisis in 1922 demonstrated the limits of cynical use of memory and the impact of cultural demobilization on diplomacy and statecraft.

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Chanak and the Memory of Gallipoli: A British Crisis of Cultural Demobilisation

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