Jun 1, 1970
able, replicas of inaccessible originals. All of the Tropes, for instance, turn on the contrast between whether something is as perceived or whether it is somehow different—but this does not require a 'copy versus original' conception of perception. The 'real nature' of something need not be assigned to an original of which we perceive copies. The assent that is withheld by Pyrrhonists is not that this faithfully reproduces a Ding an sich, that rather that this must be as it appears. Most of the Tropes would be superfluous if the worry were how replicas 'in us' squared with 'external objects.' The Pyrrhonist's formula that something perceived is "no more this than that" strikes me as pointless if affirmed of sensory replicas. Miss Stough may find it easy to show that the Pyrrhonists undermined the distinction between the real and the phenomenal by cleaving to the phenomenal, precisely because the distinction is imposed. What then is the contrast that the Pyrrhonist was working with ? I think it is a very much less metaphysically loaded contrast: it is the contrast between material-object descriptions and intentional-object descriptions. The sense in which "the phenomenon prevails from every side" (Timon) is that our perception of things is always conditioned, either by psychological or by physical factors. Things are always such-and-suchs for us. What the Skeptic seems to have despaired of is not access to Kantian things-in-themselves but of unconditioned perception. If we understand Skepticism in this way, I believe that the Tropes, for instance, are relevant. On Miss Stough's interpretation they are otiose.