Philip R. Olson
Oct 14, 2009
Citations
1
Citations
Journal
Journal of the History of Philosophy
Abstract
and misleading, and the sheer number of such instances appreciably skews the original. Butler states in the introduction (ix) that he has bracketed all of his interpolations; however, comparison with Rameil’s edition proves this not to be the case. Here is a passage from the original followed by Butler’s translation: [D]er Ursprung der Logik [ist] kein anderer als der der anderen Wissenschaften: Es kommen in ihrem Bewußtsein Bestimmungen vor, die den Sinnen nicht entnommen sind (4); “The origin of logic is no different from that of any other science. Determinations come forth in the conscious mind that, in logic but not in geometry, have not been extracted from the senses” (2). Apart from the fact that ‘vorkommen’ (‘occur’) has been mistranslated as ‘come forth’, and ‘ihrem Bewußtsein’ (‘their [sc. the sciences’] consciousness’) as ‘the conscious mind’, the insertion of a contrast between logic and geometry lacks any basis in the original. A similar instance occurs on the next page. The original reads: Das Denken sind wir, das Denkende bin ich (5). Butler turns this into “As human beings we are the activation of thinking. I am this very activation” (3). Such unmarked interpolations and transmogrifications make for uncertainty whether, at any given juncture, readers are dealing with a straight representation of the original. This lack of reliability affects the usefulness of Butler’s translation in precisely the academic contexts for which he intends it. Decisions regarding technical terms such as ‘Aufhebung’ further contribute to a certain eccentricity in the style of the text. For instance, according to Butler (xv), the phrase ‘hebt sich im Stoicismus auf ’ translates literally as ‘it raises itself beyond itself into Stoicism up there’. Though linguistic intuitions vary, it is doubtful that the phrase ‘raising itself beyond itself into something up there’ would re-translate into ‘sich aufheben’—sufficient reason to question the validity of such a cumbersome rendering. The translation of ‘an sich’ as ‘upon itself’ is a similar artifact of the encounter between Anglophone imagination and German usage. In his defense, Butler claims that “Hegel was greatly influenced by Jacobi’s ‘prepositional’ mode of discourse” (xv). Yet it is unclear how Butler arrives at this claim, given Hegel’s explicit rejection of Jacobi’s emphasis on prepositions in his 1817 review of Jacobi’s Works. Putative literalism in rendering the prepositions thus issues in idiosyncrasy rather than authenticity. In short, the bracketed insertions impede the flow of the text without increasing its clarity, while the frequency of unmarked interpolations and mistranslations, as well as the idiosyncrasy of the technical coinages, limits the value of the book. Its avowed slant toward a controversial interpretation also raises flags about its suitability as an introductory text. Given the intrinsic interest of the original, it is to be regretted that the translator and publisher did not take more care to produce a volume that could have made Hegel’s science of logic genuinely “readable and teachable” in English. B r a d y B o w m a n Pennsylvania State University