MY BRAIN, MY MIND, AND I: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MIND-UPLOADING

doi:10.1142/S1793843012400100

Paper

MY BRAIN, MY MIND, AND I: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MIND-UPLOADING

Published Jun 14, 2012 · M. Hauskeller

International Journal of Machine Consciousness

UNKNOWN SJR score

28

Citations

0

Influential Citations

Full text Semantic Scholar

Abstract

The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving "digital immortality" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made when mind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological effects (if any at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploaded mind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled.

Study Snapshot

Key takeawayMind-uploading may not achieve digital immortality, as it is unlikely that an exact functional copy of the brain will produce similar phenomenological effects and the uploaded mind will be the same self as the one modeled on its brain.

PopulationOlder adults (50-71 years)

Sample size24

MethodsObservational

OutcomesBody Mass Index projections

ResultsSocial networks mitigate obesity in older groups.

MY BRAIN, MY MIND, AND I: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MIND-UPLOADING

References

Citations