Repeated games price competition price leadership
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Repeated Games and Price Competition: Insights on Price Leadership
Oligopolistic Price Leadership in Repeated Games
In the context of repeated games, price leadership can significantly impact market dynamics and profitability. A study on the U.S. beer industry demonstrates that price leadership, where a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals, can increase profits substantially. Specifically, price leadership led to a 17% profit increase in 2006-2007 and a 22% increase in 2010-2011, primarily due to market consolidation1. This indicates that price leadership can be a powerful strategy in oligopolistic markets, enhancing profitability through coordinated pricing.
Collusive Price Leadership with Capacity Constraints
Collusive price leadership can also emerge in markets with capacity constraints. In such scenarios, firms may choose their timing of price setting strategically. A large firm might set prices early to signal its commitment to not deviate from the collusive agreement, thereby raising the collusive price compared to simultaneous price setting. This strategy results in higher profits for all firms involved2. This finding highlights the role of strategic timing in reinforcing collusive outcomes in repeated price competition.
Experimental Insights on Team-Based Price Competition
Experimental studies provide additional insights into price competition dynamics. In a duopolistic market experiment, teams of individuals competed by setting prices. The study found that prices were higher in individual competition compared to team competition. Moreover, when team members were paid based on their own asked prices, prices were sustained at higher levels than when profits were equally divided among team members3. This suggests that individual incentives within teams can influence pricing strategies and outcomes in repeated games.
Long-Run Price Competition and Consumer Expectations
Long-run price competition models consider the impact of consumer expectations on pricing strategies. In markets with forward-looking consumers, pricing in one period affects future demand and consumer expectations. This dynamic can lead to constant-price collusion or recurrent sales, depending on the market conditions4. Understanding how consumer expectations shape pricing strategies is crucial for firms engaged in long-term price competition.
Increasing Marginal Costs and Repeated Price Setting
In markets with increasing marginal costs, repeated price setting games reveal interesting equilibrium outcomes. Firms facing positive fixed costs and increasing marginal costs may choose not to be active in certain periods. The study characterizes all stationary symmetric equilibrium outcomes supported by optimal penal codes in pure strategies5. This analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of equilibrium behavior in markets with cost variations.
Strategic Buyers and Private Price Observations
The presence of large, strategic buyers can alter the equilibrium outcomes in repeated price competition. When sellers can offer different prices to different buyers, and buyers act strategically, the set of subgame perfect equilibria expands under public monitoring. However, with private monitoring, where prices are not observable to competing sellers, the equilibrium payoffs shrink. In finitely repeated games, efficient sellers dominate sales, and this result holds in infinitely repeated games if sellers condition prices on public history6. This highlights the importance of transparency and monitoring in maintaining competitive equilibria.
Coordination and Competition in Bertrand Games
In Bertrand price competition, coordination and competition strategies can lead to dynamic pricing models. The Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games suggests that price adjustments are ineffective in achieving higher profits7. This underscores the challenges of sustaining collusive pricing in highly competitive markets.
Basing Point Pricing and Collusion
Basing point pricing (BPP) can emerge as a collusive strategy in dynamic contexts. In repeated competition, BPP can serve as a punishment device, ensuring firms adhere to collusive agreements. This strategy involves using FOB pricing in one's natural market and matching rivals' delivered prices when profitable, forming a subgame perfect equilibrium8. BPP thus provides a mechanism for maintaining collusion in repeated price competition.
Price Leadership and Uncertainty in Future Costs
Uncertainty about future costs can influence price leadership and coordination. In the Chilean retail-gasoline industry, a policy intervention that reduced wholesale price variability led to decreased retail margins, particularly in markets with high price leadership intensity. This suggests that reduced uncertainty hinders price coordination incentives, impacting more coordinated markets significantly9. Understanding the role of cost uncertainty is essential for firms relying on price leadership strategies.
Conclusion
Repeated games and price competition reveal complex interactions between firms' pricing strategies, market conditions, and consumer behavior. Price leadership, collusion, strategic timing, and cost considerations all play crucial roles in shaping market outcomes. By understanding these dynamics, firms can better navigate competitive landscapes and enhance their profitability through informed pricing strategies.
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Most relevant research papers on this topic
Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry
Price leadership in the beer industry increases profits by 17 percent in 2006-2007 and 22 percent in 2010-2011, mainly due to consolidation and mergers.
Collusive price leadership with capacity constraints
Collusive price leadership in capacity-constrained repeated price competition leads to higher profits for all firms, as early price setting demonstrates commitment and raises the collusive price compared to simultaneous moves.
Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams
Individual price competition leads to higher asking prices than team competition, and prices are sustained at higher levels when each team member is paid his or her own asking price than when profits are shared equally.
Long-run price competition
This paper extends the repeated-games model to include long-lived and forward-looking consumers, analyzing the effects of pricing on future demand and price expectations.
Repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs
Pure strategy equilibria exist in repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs and positive fixed costs, supporting optimal penal codes.
Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices
Private monitoring reduces the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated price competition with large buyers, while public monitoring expands it.
A Study of Coordination and Competition in Bertrand Price Repeated Game
The Bertrand Price Repeated Game is a dynamic model with Nash equilibrium as a result of infinity repeated games, and price rise or fall in Nash equilibrium is invalid.
Basing Point Pricing - Competition Versus Collusion
Basing point pricing (BPP) can emerge in dynamic contexts and can serve as a punishment device in repeated competition.
Price Leadership and Uncertainty About Future Costs*
Reducing uncertainty about future wholesale prices hinders price coordination incentives, with greater impact in more coordinated markets.
On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer
Quantity leadership in supply chains leads to lower wholesale prices, allowing both parties to coexist in the market, and can be sustained when the CM's bargaining power is high and the non-competitive CM's wholesale price is high.
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